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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jason Leonard Williams appeals in consolidated Docket Nos. 40077 and 
40078 from the district court's orders revoking his probation and executing the 
sentences imposed upon his convictions for possession of a controlled 
substance, burglary, and aiding and abetting grand theft. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In June 2004, Williams and Anthony Boyette broke into a home and stole 
numerous items, including jewelry, two guns and ammunition, and several 
financial transaction cards. (PSI, pp.2, 23-24, 34-36, 70-72.1) Williams, Boyette 
and others subsequently used the financial transaction cards to make multiple 
purchases at several local businesses. (PSI, pp.24-28, 30-32, 36.) When 
apprehended by police, Williams admitted to having assisted Boyette in 
burglarizing the home. (PSI, pp.34-36, 70-72.) He also admitted to having 
assisted Boyette in a number of other "jobs" involving the theft of items from 
vehicles, homes, garages and construction sites. (PSI, pp.36-37, 73-76.) 
The state charged Williams in Docket No. 40078 (CR-04-12392) with one 
count of burglary and one count of aiding and abetting grand theft. (R., pp.20-
21.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Williams pied guilty as charged and the state 
dismissed a charge in an unrelated case. (R., pp.24A-26.) The district court 
accepted plea, imposed concurrent unified sentences of four years, with two 
1 Unnumbered pages attached to the PSI have been numbered consecutively, 
beginning with page15. 
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years fixed, for burglary and eight years, with two years fixed, for aiding and 
abetting grand theft, and retained jurisdiction for 180 days. (R., pp.56-57.) 
Judgment was entered on November 8, 2004. (R., p.56.) Two hundred thirty-
four days later, on June 30, 2005, the district court entered an order purporting to 
suspend the balance of Williams' sentences and place him on probation for four 
years. (R., pp.68-69.) 
Around the same time judgment was entered in Docket No. 40078, the 
state filed an Information in Docket No. 40077 (CR-04-20647) charging Williams 
with possessing methamphetamine. (R., pp.133-34.) Williams pied guilty to the 
charge and the district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two 
years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.137-41.) The court ordered the 
sentence to run concurrently with the sentences imposed in Docket No. 40078. 
(R., p.141.) Near the conclusion of the retained jurisdiction period, on June 30, 
2005, the district court entered an order suspending the balance of Williams' 
sentence and placing him on probation for four years. (R., pp.144-47.) 
On July 3, 2008, Williams' probation officer filed a report of violation, 
alleging that Williams had violated his probation by failing to make restitution 
payments, consuming alcohol at least four times per week, smoking marijuana, 
being cited for driving without privileges and failing to report the citation to his 
probation officer, changing residences without permission, living with an 
individual with whom he was instructed to have no contact, and failing to pay the 
cost of supervision. (7/3/08 Report Of Probation Violation (Augmentation)). 
Williams admitted all but one of the allegations (the one relating to restitution 
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payments) and the district court continued him on probation for two years in both 
cases, imposing as an additional condition that he participate in and complete 
felony drug court. (R., pp.72-73, 79-81, 149-50, 156-58.) 
On August 4, 2010, Williams' probation officer filed a second report of 
violation, alleging that Williams had violated his probation by being terminated 
from drug court for using the synthetic cannibinoid, "Spice." (8/4/10 Report Of 
Probation Violation (Augmentation).) Williams' probation officer also noted that, 
during the two years he participated in drug court, Williams had twice been 
previously sanctioned for using marijuana. (Id.) Williams admitted the allegation, 
and the district court revoked his probation, ordered his underlying sentences 
executed and retained jurisdiction for a second time in both cases. (R., pp.84-88, 
160-64.) Near the conclusion of the retained jurisdiction period, the district court 
suspended the balance of Williams' sentences and reinstated him on probation, 
in both cases, for five years. (R., pp.90-94, 166-70.) 
Nine months later, on April 25, 2012, Williams' probation officer filed a 
third report of violation, alleging that Williams had violated his probation by being 
terminated from his Therapeutic Community Aftercare and Cognitive Self-
Change groups due to his "ongoing drug use and fail[ure] to follow group rules," 
by associating and smoking "Spice" with another felony probationer, and by 
smoking both marijuana and "Spice" on several occasions in a four-month period. 
(4/25/12 Report Of Probation Violation (Augmentation).) Williams admitted the 
allegations, and the district court revoked his probation and ordered his 
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underlying sentences executed in both cases. (R., pp.97-100, 103-05, 172-75, 
178-80.) 
Williams filed notices of appeal, in both cases, on May 30, 2012. (R., 
pp.106-08, 181-83.) He also filed motions for reduction of his sentences, which 
the district court denied. (R., pp.112-13, 116-17, 187-88, 191.) 
After the appellate record was settled, Williams filed a motion to suspend 
the briefing schedule and to augment the record with numerous as-yet 
unprepared transcripts, including a transcript of his December 2004 change of 
plea and sentencing hearing and transcripts of the admission and disposition 
hearings associated with his first and second probation violations. (10/25/12 
Motion.) The state filed an objection. (10/29/12 Objection.) The Idaho Supreme 
Court denied Williams' motion with respect to each of the aforementioned 
requested transcripts. (11/7/12 Order.) 
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ISSUES 
Williams states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Williams due process 
and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment 
with transcripts necessary for review of the issues on 
appeal? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied [sic] 
failed to reduce his sentences sua sponte in both cases? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Williams failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his 
constitutional rights when it denied his motion to augment the appellate 
record with irrelevant transcripts? 
2. Must Williams' appeal in Docket No. 40078 be dismissed as untimely? 
3. Has Williams failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion 






Williams Has Failed To Establish That The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His 
Constitutional Rights When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate 
Record With Irrelevant Transcripts 
Introduction 
Williams contends that, by denying his motion to augment the appellate 
record with as-yet unprepared transcripts of his 2004 guilty plea and sentencing 
hearing and other court hearings associated with his first and second periods of 
supervised probation, the Idaho Supreme Court has violated his constitutional 
rights to due process, equal protection, and effective assistance of counsel. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.6-20.) Application of the relevant law shows Williams has 
failed to establish any constitutional violation resulting from the denial of his 
motion to augment the record with the requested transcripts. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
C. Williams Has Shown No Violation Of His Rights To Due Process, Equal 
Protection Or Effective Assistance Of Counsel 
A defendant in a criminal case has a due process right to "a record on 
appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged 
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regarding the proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 
472, 477 (2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. 
Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms 
and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)); see also 
State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, _, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012); State 
v. Cornelison, _ Idaho_, _ P.3d _, 2013 WL 1613842 (Idaho App., 
April 11, 2013) (petition for review pending). The state, however, "will not be 
required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide transcripts that "will not be 
germane to consideration of the appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. at 495; see also 
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 123 (1996) (indigent appellant has right to "a 
transcript of relevant trial proceedings"). Rather, an indigent defendant is 
entitled, at state expense, to only those transcripts and portions of the record 
necessary to pursue the issues raised on appeal. Griffin, 351 U.S. 12; Lane, 372 
U.S. 477. To show prejudice Williams "must present something more than gross 
speculation that the transcripts were requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v. Elo, 302 
F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2002). 
In Morgan, the Idaho Court of Appeals rejected Morgan's contention that 
the Idaho Supreme Court violated his constitutional rights in denying his motion 
to augment the appellate record with transcripts of hearings associated with the 
first of his two probation violation proceedings. Morgan, 153 Idaho at_, 288 
P.3d at 837-839. At the outset, the Idaho Court of Appeals "disclaim[ed] any 
authority to review, and, in effect, reverse an Idaho Supreme Court decision 
made on a motion made prior to assignment of the case to [the Idaho Court of 
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Appeals] on the ground that the Supreme Court decision was contrary to the 
state or federal constitutions or other law." l!;L at_, 288 P.3d at 837. Such an 
undertaking, the Court explained, "would be tantamount to the Court of Appeals 
entertaining an 'appeal' from an Idaho Supreme Court decision and is plainly 
beyond the purview of this Court." l!;L; see also Cornelison, 2013 WL 1613842 at 
*2-3 (rejecting Cornelison's argument that I.AR. 108(a) granted the Idaho Court 
of Appeals the implicit authority to review the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his 
motion to augment the appellate record). 
However, the Idaho Court of Appeals did leave open the possibility of 
review of such motions in some circumstances. Morgan, 153 Idaho at_, 288 
P.3d at 837. Such circumstances may occur, the Court indicated, where "the 
completed briefs have refined, clarified, or expanded issues on appeal in such a 
way as to demonstrate the need for additional records or transcripts, or where 
new evidence is presented to support a renewed motion." l!;L 
Should the Idaho Court of Appeals be assigned this case, it lacks the 
authority to review the Idaho Supreme Court's order. Williams has failed in his 
Appellant's brief to demonstrate the need for additional transcripts, and he has 
not presented any evidence to support a renewed motion to augment the record. 
The arguments Williams advances in his Appellant's brief as to why the record 
should be augmented with the transcripts at issue constitute essentially the same 
arguments he presented to the Idaho Supreme Court in his motion - i.e., that the 
district court may have relied on statements or evidence from those hearings in 
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making its final decision to revoke probation and order his sentences executed 
without reduction. (Compare 10/25/12 Motion with Appellant's brief, pp.6-18.) 
Williams acknowledges Morgan, but contends that "the Morgan Court's 
statement that Mr. Morgan could have filed a renewed motion to augment directly 
with the Court of Appeals [in order to demonstrate the need for additional records 
or transcripts] is contrary to the Appellate Rules," which, according to Williams, 
"require all motions to be filed directly with the Idaho Supreme Court." 
(Appellant's brief, pp.13-14, n.5.) However, the Idaho Court of Appeals recently 
rejected a nearly identical argument in Cornelison, reasoning: 
We reject that interpretation of the rule because we 
recognize this to be contrary to the grant of authority in Idaho 
Appellate Rule 101. That rule provides in part, 'The Idaho Appellate 
Rules shall apply to all proceedings in the Court of Appeals as well 
as the following rules." I.AR. 101. By way of Rule 101, this Court 
also has authority to entertain motions to augment the record as 
provided by Rule 30 after the case has been assigned to this Court. 
Moreover, if we were to accept Cornelison's interpretation, it would 
result in a lack of authority of this Court to entertain any motions. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 32(c), applicable to the Court of Appeals via 
Rule 101, allows any other motions permitted under the rules, other 
than a motion to dismiss, to be made at any time, before or after 
the case is set for oral argument. By way of that authority, this 
Court routinely rules on motions such as motions for continuance, 
motions regarding briefing (including motions to join briefing, file 
supplemental briefing, exceed the page limits, revise a brief, 
request an extension of time to file a brief, or request permission to 
file a late brief), motions to expedite the appeal, motions to 
withdraw as counsel, motions for a stay of proceedings, motions to 
augment the record, renewed motions to augment the record, and 
motions to allow or to vacate oral argument. Under the Idaho 
Appellate Rules, we have the authority to review and rule on 
motions made by a party after the case has been assigned to this 
Court. 
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In sum, we adhere to our conclusion in Morgan that 
reviewing the denial of a motion to augment the record by the 
Supreme Court is beyond the scope of our authority. If a party files 
a renewed motion after the case assignment to this Court and 
presents new information or justification for the motion, we have the 
authority to rule on the motion. 
Cornelison, 2013 WL 1613842 at *4.2 
Because the Idaho Court of Appeals lacks the authority to review, and in 
effect, reverse a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court, and because Williams has 
failed to provide any new evidence or clarification in his Appellant's brief that 
would permit the Idaho Court of Appeals to do so, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
must decline, if it is assigned this case, to review the Idaho Supreme Court's 
denial of Williams' motion to augment the record. 
To the extent this Court considers the merits of Williams' constitutional 
claims, all of his arguments fail. Williams' appeal is timely only from the district 
court's May 25, 2012 order finally revoking his probation in Docket No. 40077.3 
(Compare R., p.178 (order revoking probation filed 5/25/12) with p.181 (notice of 
appeal filed 5/30/12).) On appeal, Williams challenges only the district court's 
decision to not reduce his sentence upon the final revocation of his probation. 
(See generally Appellant's brief.) The existing appellate record includes 
transcripts of the admit/deny and disposition hearings associated with Williams' 
2 The Idaho Court of Appeals also noted that, in addition to filing a renewed 
motion to augment the record and/or expanding or clarifying his augmentation 
request in his appellant's brief, Cornelison also had the right to file a petition for 
review of its decision with the Idaho Supreme Court. Cornelison, 2013 WL 
1613842 at *2 n.2. 
3 For the reasons set forth in Section 11, infra, Williams" appeal in Docket No. 
40078 is not timely. 
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final probation violation. (See generally 5/9/12 Tr.; 5/16/12 Tr.; 5/23/12 Tr.) The 
record also includes court minutes from Williams' change of plea and sentencing 
hearings, as well as each of the hearings that were the subject of his motion to 
augment the record; the original PSI and attachments; and two APSl's, prepared 
after each period of retained jurisdiction. (See generally R.; 10/28/04 PSI; 5/9/05 
APSI; 6/27/11 APSI.) 
Williams nevertheless contends this available information is inadequate for 
appellate review of his claims. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-20.) However, each of the 
hearings associated with transcript request occurred prior to his third period of 
probation. (See 10/25/12 Motion.) The district court did not have transcripts of 
these hearings at the time it elected to revoke Williams' probation and execute 
his sentences without reduction, and there is no indication that the district court 
actually relied on anything that was said at these prior hearings in making this 
sentencing determination. 
Williams appears to assert that State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 218 
P.3d 5 (Ct. App. 2009), which requires appellate review of the entire record of 
proceedings in the trial court up to and including the final revocation of probation, 
entitles him to transcripts of each of the hearings conducted throughout his 
criminal proceedings. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-13.) However, as explained in 
Morgan, such an interpretation of Hanington is too broad. Morgan, 153 Idaho at 
_, 288 P.3d at 838. The Court of Appeals clarified that although it "will not 
arbitrarily confine [itself] to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the 
time of the revocation of probation ... that does not mean that all proceedings in 
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the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane." !5;L (emphasis 
original). Rather, "[t]he focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial 
court's decision to revoke probation." !5;L Accordingly, the Court "will consider 
the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of 
probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal." ~ 
Because all relevant information to the district court's decision to not reduce 
Williams' sentence upon revocation of his probation is already included in the 
record on appeal, Williams has failed to show any due process violation resulting 
from the Supreme Court's order denying his motion to augment the record. 
Additionally, Williams was afforded all the process he was due in relation 
to the preparation of the appellate record before the record was settled. As 
noted in Morgan, "The parties to an appeal have twenty-eight days from the 
service of the record to request additions or corrections to the record, Idaho 
Appellate Rule 29(a)." ~at_, 288 P.3d at 838-839. "[Williams] was afforded 
the opportunity to designate not only the standard clerk's record, but also 
additional records necessary for including in the clerk's record on appeal. I.AR. 
28(a), (c)." ~ Therefore, "[Williams] was provided the process by which he 
could designate all documents in the record necessary for appeal .... " !5;L 
Although the appellate rules also "provide[] that a party may move the Supreme 
Court to add to the settled clerk's record, nothing therein creates a right to such 
augmentation." ~ For these reasons, the Idaho Court of Appeals has rejected 
the proposition that "the ability to designate records necessary for appellate 
review under I.AR. 28 [is] insufficient to afford due process." !5;L 
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Williams' equal protection argument also lacks merit. The Court in 
Morgan rejected the argument that equal protection mandates augmentation of 
all transcripts the appellant desires, stating: 
Morgan was not denied the transcripts because of indigency. 
Morgan was afforded the opportunity to designate not only the 
standard clerk's record, but also additional records necessary for 
inclusion in the clerk's record on appeal. He had time to review the 
record and make any objections, corrections, additions, or deletions 
prior to settling of the record, pursuant to I.AR. 29(a). Morgan's 
failure to fully and timely utilize the Idaho Appellate Rules, and his 
failure to demonstrate the need for the transcripts in his motion to 
augment the record, precluded him from including the first 
probation violation hearing transcripts, not his indigency. Morgan's 
motion to augment failed to make a showing that any appellant, 
indigent or otherwise, would be entitled to the record as requested. 
Id. at_, 288 P.3d at 839. Williams' equal protection claim fails for the same 
reasons. 
Finally, the Court in Morgan also rejected the assertion that the denial of a 
motion to augment the record on appeal results in the deprivation of the effective 
assistance of counsel. Id. Williams, like Morgan, "has failed to demonstrate how 
effective assistance of counsel is not possible without the requested transcripts." 
Id. 
The appellate record in this case is more than adequate to review 
Williams' claim that the district court abused its discretion by declining to reduce 
his sentences following the revocation of his probation. In addition, Williams has 
failed to show any violation of his equal protection rights or his Sixth Amendment 
right to the effective assistance of counsel. He has therefore failed to show that 
the Idaho Supreme Court violated his constitutional rights by denying his motion 
to augment the appellate record. 
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11. 
Williams' Appeal In Docket No. 40078 Must Be Dismissed As Untimely 
Williams argues that the district court abused its discretion by not sua 
sponte reducing his sentences upon revoking his probation in Docket No. 40078. 
(Appellant's brief, p.21.) Williams' appeal in Docket No. 40078 must be 
dismissed, however, because Williams failed to timely file his notice of appeal 
from any order over which the district court had subject matter jurisdiction. 
Rule 14 of the Idaho Appellate Rules provides that an appeal in a criminal 
matter must be filed within 42 days from the date of the filing of "any judgment or 
order of the district court appealable as a matter of right." I.AR. 14(a). An order 
entered by the district court without subject matter jurisdiction is void and, 
therefore, not appealable as a matter of right. State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 
163, 244 P.3d 1244, 1249 (2010). The failure to timely file a notice of appeal 
from an appealable order is a jurisdictional defect and requires automatic 
dismissal of the appeal. I.AR. 21; State v. Ciccone, 150 Idaho 305, 306, 246 
P.3d 958, 959 (2010) (citation omitted); Urrabazo, 150 Idaho at 163, 244 P.3d at 
1249. 
Williams filed his notice of appeal within 42 days of the district court's May 
25, 2012 order revoking his probation. (Compare R., p.103 with R., p.106.) As 
Williams concedes on appeal, however, that order is void for want of subject 
matter jurisdiction. (See Appellant's brief, p.1 n.1, p.25.) When the district court 
originally sentenced Williams, on November 8, 2004, it retained jurisdiction over 
Williams' case pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2601 (4). (R., pp.56-57.) At the 
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time, Idaho Code§ 19-2601 (4) strictly limited the period of retained jurisdiction to 
180 days. I.C. § 19-2601 (4) (2004). The court's jurisdiction thus expired on May 
7, 2005, at which time Williams automatically remained committed to the custody 
of the Department of Correction. I.C. § 19-2601(4) (2004); Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 
at 163, 244 P.3d at 1249; State v. Petersen, 149 Idaho 808, 811, 241 P.3d 981, 
984 (Ct. App. 2010). The court's subsequent order, entered June 30, 2005, 
purporting to place Williams on probation, and all of the orders that followed -
including the court's May 25, 2012 order revoking Williams' probation - were 
entered without subject matter jurisdiction and are void. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho at 
163, 244 P.3d at 1249; State v. Taylor, 142 Idaho 30, 31-32, 121 P.3d 961, 962-
63 (2005); Petersen, 149 Idaho at 811, 241 P .3d at 984. Williams did not file his 
notice of appeal until May 30, 2012 (R., p.106) - over seven years after the 
district court lost jurisdiction. Because Williams did not file his notice of appeal 
within 42 days of any order appealable as a matter of right, his appeal is untimely 
and must be dismissed. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho at 163,244 P.3d at 1249. 
111. 
Williams Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
By Executing His Sentence Without Reduction Upon Finally Revoking His 
Probation In Docket No. 40077 
A. Introduction 
Williams contends that the district court abused its discretion by not sua 
sponte reducing his sentence upon revoking his probation in Docket No. 40077. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.21-24.) A review of the record supports the district court's 
sentencing decision; Williams has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to reduce an underlying sentence upon the 
revocation of probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009). 
C. The District Court Acted Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
Upon revoking a defendant's probation, a court may order the original 
sentence executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule 
35. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing 
State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 326, 834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989)). A court's 
decision to not reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject 
to the well-established standards governing whether a sentence is excessive. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7. Those standards require an appellant 
to "establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was 
excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment." State v. Stover, 
140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those objectives are: "(1) 
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) 
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing." 
State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The reviewing 
court "will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the 
original judgment," i.e., "facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as 
events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of 
probation." Hanington, 148 Idaho at 29, 218 P.3d at 8. 
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Williams has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its 
discretion by not sua sponte reducing his sentence upon revoking his probation. 
As noted by the presentence investigator in the original PSI, Williams has "an 
extensive prior criminal history of drugs, alcohol and theft-related charges." (PSI, 
p.12; see also PSI, pp.3-6 (criminal record includes convictions for, inter alia, 
possessing drug paraphernalia, DWP (three convictions), resisting and 
obstructing officers, DUI, possessing a controlled substance (two convictions), 
burglary and aiding and abetting grand theft).) He has been placed on probation 
numerous times and, in fact, had the benefit and opportunity of three separate 
periods of probation in this case. (PSI, pp.3-4, 7; R., pp.144-47, 156-58, 166-70.) 
He also had the benefit of two separate periods of retained jurisdiction and 
participated in felony drug court. (R., pp.140-41, 163-64; 5/9/05 APSI; 6/27/11 
APSI; 8/4/10 Report Of Violation.) Despite these numerous rehabilitative 
opportunities, Williams has demonstrated himself either unable or unwilling to 
abide by the law and the conditions of community supervision. 
While he was on probation in the instant case, Williams continued to 
consume alcohol, smoked marijuana and "Spice," was cited for driving without 
privileges, changed residence without permission, associated with individuals 
with whom he was instructed by his probation officer to have no contact, and was 
terminated from rehabilitative programming, including felony drug court, TC 
Aftercare and a Cognitive Self-Change group. (7/3/08 Report Of Probation 
Violation; 8/4/10 Report Of Probation Violation; 4/25/12 Report Of Probation 
Violation.) Williams' probation officer attempted to gain Williams' compliance 
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with the law and the terms of his probation by employing a number of 
intermediate sanctions, including discretionary jail time, random UA's, drug-
testing, drug court, and "considerable treatment" programs, but to no avail. (See 
id.) Even after two periods of retained jurisdiction, during which Williams 
participated in and successfully completed both the Therapeutic Community and 
"A New Direction" drug and alcohol treatment program, Williams continued to use 
illegal substances and, as a result, was terminated from his aftercare 
programming. (5/9/05 APSI; 6/27/11 APSI; 4/25/12 Report Of Violation.) 
In deciding to finally revoke Williams' probation and order his sentence 
executed without reduction, the district court considered Williams' track record on 
probation and, specifically, his history of repeatedly resorting to the use of 
controlled substances while on community supervision. (5/23/12 Tr., p.9, L.17 -
p.10, L.17.) The court considered Williams' request for an unsatisfactory 
discharge from probation but rejected it, reasoning: 
I am concerned that we are fighting the same fight now as we were 
fighting two, three, four, five years ago. In the meantime, we have 
done Drug Court. I think we spent a couple years in Drug Court, 
and then you went on a retained jurisdiction. You get back in July 
of 2011 and within six months are back to doing the same stuff. I 
just can't look past that. This is not an issue of technical violations. 
And sometimes I will give an unsatisfactory discharge after a long 
probation if there's just kind of technical stuff going on. This is not 
technical; this is just failure to complete the programming and use 
of - consistent use of drugs in violation of the rules. And those are 
behaviors that you make conscious decisions to do. In spite of the 
fact that you're doing some other things which should be positive, 
you are shooting yourself in the foot by gratifying yourself with the 
use of controlled substances. So I, frankly, am not going to reward 
that by an unsatisfactory discharge. 
(5/23/12Tr., p.9, L.18-p.10, L.12.) 
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Just as Williams was not entitled to the reward of an unsatisfactory 
discharge for his repeated choices to use illegal substances while on probation, 
he was likewise not entitled to the reward of a sua sponte reduction in his 
underlying sentence. The district court's decision to revoke Williams' probation 
and order his sentence executed without reduction was entirely reasonable in 
light of Williams' continued refusal to abide by the conditions of community 
supervision and his failure to rehabilitate despite having been afforded numerous 
rehabilitative opportunities. Given any reasonable view of the facts, Williams has 
failed to establish an abuse of sentencing discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to dismiss Williams' appeal in 
Docket No. 40078 and to affirm the district court's order revoking Williams' 
probation and executing his underlying sentence without reduction in Docket No. 
40077. 
DATED this 16th day of May, 2013. 
RI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney G 
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